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THE DUBIOUS CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE
COPYRIGHT TERM EXTENSION ACT
RichardA. Epstein*
I. INTRODUCTION

The Copyright Term Extension Act of 1998 (CTEA) l counts as
one of the most controversial pieces of legislation to pass Congress
in many a moon. Its chief consequence is to extend the effective
term of all new and existing copyrights by twenty years. 2 Prior to its
passage, works authored by an identifiable natural person enjoyed
protection for a term of life plus fifty years.3 Works-for-hire,
anonymous works, and pseudonymous works received protection either for one hundred years from creation or seventy-five years from
4 The CTEA tacks twenty years
publication, whichever was shorter.
5
periods.
onto each of these two
The CTEA is the most recent, but not necessarily the last, step in
a constant expansion of copyright protection. 6 Under the first Copyright Act of 1790, copyrights followed the English model, with a
fourteen-year life, subject to a single period of renewal for another
fourteen years.7 In 1831, Congress extended the initial term another
In 1909,
fourteen years, for a total period of forty-two years.'
* James Parker Hall Distinguished Service Professor of Law, The University of Chicago; Peter and Kirsten Bedford Senior Fellow, The Hoover Institution. My thanks to Dennis Karjala for his valuable comments on an earlier
draft of this piece, and to Justin Herring, The University of Chicago Law
School, Class of 2004, for his usual able research assistance.
1. Sonny Bono Copyright Term Extension Act, Pub. L. No. 105-298, 112
Stat. 2827 (1998).
2. See id.
3. See 17 U.S.C. § 302(a) (1976).
4. See id. § 302(c).
5. See id. § 302(a), (c).
6. See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 374 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
7. See Act of May 31, 1790, ch. 15, § 1, 1 Stat. 124, 124.
8. See Act of Feb. 3, 1831, ch. 16 § 1-2, 4 Stat. 436, 436.
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Congress extended the renewal period to twenty-eight years, 9 for a
total period of fifty-six years, and pushed back the beginning of the
term from the date of recording the title to the first date of publication. 10 Other incremental extensions have taken place as well." In
1976, Congress tacked on another nineteen years to the copyright renewal and extension term. 12 All of these extensions applied both to
future copyrights and to copyrights still in effect at the time of passage. However, lapsed copyrights for materials in the public domain
were not revived.
These term extensions did not take place within a vacuum, for
Congress has strengthened the protection afforded to copyright owners in other ways. One set of reforms deals with the mechanics for
obtaining copyright protection. The early copyright law required individuals first to register and then renew their copyrights to secure
protection. Today, the system provides one automatic term for all
copyrightable work. 13 In order to comply with the Berne Convention, Congress removed the requirement that the copyright holder affix a notice to the protected work. 14 Finally, in 1992, Congress authorized automatic renewal for works initially published or registered
before 1978.15 By degrees, the copyright law has flipped over from a
system that protected only rights that were claimed to one that vests
all rights, whether claimed or not.
Copyright protection has also expanded along substantive dimensions. The original 1790 Act, for example, provided the original
holder no claims over derivative works, including translations,
9. See Act of Mar. 4, 1909, ch. 320, § 23, 35 Stat. 1075, 1080.
10. See id.
11. See Act of Dec. 31, 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-573, tit. I, § 104, 88 Stat.

1873, 1873; Act of Oct. 25, 1972, Pub. L. No. 92-566, 86 Stat. 1181; Act of
Nov. 24, 1971, Pub. L. No. 92-170, 85 Stat. 490; Act of Dec. 17, 1970, Pub. L.
No. 91-555, 84 Stat. 1441; Act of Dec. 16, 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-147, 83 Stat.
360; Act of July 23, 1968, Pub. L. No. 90-416, 82 Stat. 397; Act of Nov. 16,
1967, Pub. L. No. 90-141, 81 Stat. 464; Act of Aug. 28, 1965, Pub. L. No. 89142, 79 Stat. 581; Act of Sept. 19, 1962, Pub. L. No. 87-668, 76 Stat. 555.
12. See Copyright Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, § 304(a), 90 Stat. 2541, 2573
(1976).
13. See id. § 302(a), (b), (c).
14. See Berne Convention Implementation Act of 1988, Pub. L. No. 100568, § 7(a), (b), 102 Stat. 2853, 2857.
15. See Copyright Amendments Act of 1992, Pub. L. No. 102-307, 106
Stat. 264, 264-265 (codified as amended at 17 U.S.C. § 304(a)).
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abridgments, performances, or displays. 16 Over time, control over
these matters has been gradually added to the bundle of rights enjoyed by the copyright holder. The copyright holder cannot, of
course, appropriate the work of the translator or adapter, but by the
same token the translator or adapter cannot publish his work except
under license from the original copyright holder. Both the original
and new authors have blocking positions over the other with respect
to these derivative works, creating a holdout problem where none existed under the older law. All in all, the extension of copyright protection along multiple dimensions has clear synergistic effects. The
twenty-year extension by the CTEA is worth more simply because it
covers more.
II. THE CTEA IN POLITICAL AND CONSTITUTIONAL CONTEXT

To evaluate both the constitutionality and soundness of the
CTEA, it is important to distinguish between two contexts: the term
extension for existing copyrights and the creation of a longer term for
all future copyrights. The second context, which asks about the optimal length of ownership, presents a trickier issue to evaluate on the
17
merits. With land (or for that matter trade names and trademarks),
the optimal period of legal ownership is infinite. Land may be used
only by one person, so placing it into the public domain does not create any social benefit. The original owner can best develop the property under an infinite time horizon. If the original owner prefers to
lease out the property, then the original owner and the tenant can negotiate specific provisions to deal with matters pertaining to the
property, such as the ownership of improvements at the termination
of the lease. The law should not place artificial limitations on the
ownership of property. The same can be said for brand names and
trademarks. When brand names and trademarks are placed in the
public domain, they lose value. Brand-identification becomes impossible when brand names and trademarks do not belong to one
owner but are plastered over products that come from thousands of
different sources. In each case, individuals can acquire land, trade

16. See, e.g., Stowe v. Thomas, 23 F. Cas. 201, 206 (C.C.E.D. Pa. 1853)
(No. 13,514) (holding that a translation is not an infringement).
17. See Richard A. Epstein, Intellectual Property: Old Boundariesand New
Frontiers,76 IND. L.J. 803, 821-27 (2001).
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names, or trademarks of their own, so that their preclusive effects are
minimal.
In contrast, however, copyrights and patents should be confined
to limited periods. The choice of the optimal duration depends on
the familiar trade-off embodied in the concepts of "property right"
and "legal monopoly," which are different terms with different connotations for the same legal institution. On the upside, a copyright
works like a property right: the longer period of exclusivity increases the incentive to create the invention or writing in the first
place. Unfortunately, on the downside, a copyright works like a legal monopoly: it restricts dissemination after creation, because the
copyright or patent holder will charge some fee for the use of the
writing or invention. Price, therefore, will exceed marginal cost, so
that in the absence of perfect price discrimination, some potential users of the intellectual property will go elsewhere. 18 Hence, the law
must choose between the incentives to create on the one hand, and
open public use of created material on the other. The nature of this
tradeoff-more production versus more dissemination-has always
been at the center of Supreme Court deliberations. Justice Stevens
captured the essential nature of the social trade-off when he wrote:
The monopoly privileges that Congress may authorize are
neither unlimited nor primarily designed to provide a special private benefit. Rather, the limited grant is a means by
which an important public purpose may be achieved. It is
intended to motivate the creative activity of authors and inventors by the provision of a special reward, and to allow
the public access to the products of their genius after the
limited period of exclusive control has expired. 19
But just how limited the grant should be and why are complex questions which help demonstrate the reasons for copyright and patent
statutes being subject to constant refinement and modification. The
real issue in both cases concerns where and how to draw the line.

18. To see why the use is greater, assume that a copyright costs $X per use,
however defined. Any potential user whose value is greater than $0, but less
than $X, is excluded from the system. Indeed, once transaction costs are fac-

tored in, any individual whose use value is less than $X plus $T (for transaction costs) will be excluded as well.
19. Sony Corp. v. Universal City Studios, Inc., 464 U.S. 417, 429 (1984).
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Just about everyone agrees that literary works should receive
longer protection than design patents (which currently are protected
for twenty years), even if the selection of the optimal time period is
highly contested. But for a new work by a thirty year-old author, the
difference between life plus fifty years and life plus seventy years
cashes out as the difference between exclusive rights for 100 or 120
years. Even with modest discount rates, going forward, very little
turns on the choice for the proper legal regime that governs product
use in remote years. But if the monopoly fails to be extended, the
benefits from leaving the property in the public domain become trivial as well. Who knows whether tiny increments in the incentive to
produce are more important than tiny increments of public access?
This discussion has constitutional ramifications. Because any
social judgment on the optimal copyright term is so unclear, no one
has figured out how to give content to the words "for limited Times,"
as they appear in the Patent and Copyright Clause (hereinafter
"Copyright Clause" or "Clause"). 20 Any fixed period counts as a
limited time. Presumably, a billion-year term would run afoul of the
Clause. So why not a million or a thousand years? It is hard to answer that question, especially since the economic difference between
a 100-year copyright (legal) and a perpetual copyright (illegal) is
trivial compared to the differences between a fourteen-year and a
100-year copyright period, both of which are unquestionably legal.
The ban on a perpetual patent and copyright monopoly places, at
most, a small constraint on the mischief that Congress can bring
about, or the good it can do.
The stakes, however, become much larger in the context of a
twenty-year extension of an existing copyright that, say, has only a
couple of years to run. Now the addition, say, of new protection
from year 2004 to 2024 adds back to the copyright holder over ninety
percent of the current discounted value of the remainder of the copyright term, with the alluring prospect of further extensions down the
road. The harsh denunciations of the CTEA all stem from a single,
simple observation. The CTEA counts as a bad deal for the public
on existing copyrights, many of which are close to falling into the
20. Congress shall have the power "[t]o promote the Progress of Science
and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the
exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries." U.S. CONST. art.
I, § 8, cl. 8.
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public domain. The additional period of monopoly control does
nothing to stimulate the social production of new and important
works, even if it pads the wealth of the widows and children of the
original copyright holders, many of whom testified on behalf of the
CTEA. 2 '
To its critics, of whom I count myself as one, the CTEA looks
22
a
like massive giveaway of public domain resources for private use.
This widespread academic consensus has spurred Lawrence Lessig,
now of Stanford Law School, to lead the charge against the Act in
Eldred v. Ashcroft, 23 which is now pending before the Supreme
Court. In this case, the Circuit Court for the District of Columbia
upheld the CTEA against two forms of constitutional challenges.24
The first insists that, in light of its structure and purpose, the Copyright Clause does not confer on Congress the power to enact the
CTEA. 25 The second argues that in any clash between the Copyright
Clause and the First Amendment, the Copyright Clause comes out
second best.26 The CTEA restricts speech that, in the ordinary
course of events, would have been free. I have a few observations on
both scores. The upshot, I should add, is not entirely to my liking,
for I think that under the current law the government is likely to win,
when, as a matter of principle, it ought to lose.
More concretely, the culprit lies in the standard for judicial review, which cashes out to a rational basis standard for cases under
the Copyright Clause. If that test is used, then virtually any advantage that one can assign to the CTEA will allow a compliant Court to
conclude that this statute will "promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts..." and thus, fall within Congress's power under the
21. See generally Copyright Term, Film Labeling, and Film Preservation
Legislation: Hearing on H.R. 989, H.R. 1248, and H.R. 1734 Before the Subcomm. on Courts and Intellectual Prop. of the Comm. on the Judiciary, 104th
Cong. (1996). The argument in question is bogus. It held that the copyright
term should be increased with increases in expected lives. But the two do not
run in tandem. The holder of a copyright could purchase an annuity out of
royalties, present or future, that can run for longer than the copyright period.
The two decisions therefore are completely separate.
22. See Richard A. Epstein, Congress'sCopyright Giveaway, WALL ST. J.,
Dec. 21, 1998, at A19.
23. Eldred v. Ashcroft, No. 01-618 (U.S. oral argument Oct. 9, 2002).
24. See id. at 374.
25. See id.
26. See id. at 376.
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Copyright Clause. Moreover, so long as the Copyright Clause is not
used to stifle criticism of existing works-which has never happened-then it appears that the expansion of property protection will
not interfere with the freedom of speech, which is implicitly defined
in such a way as to accommodate all valid intellectual property
rights. Neither of these justifications for the CTEA will survive,
however, a higher level of judicial scrutiny.
A. JudicialReview Under the CopyrightClause: A Tale of Three
Standards
The first question about any constitutional challenge goes to the
standard of review that is brought to the particular case.27 Identifying the right standard is of necessity an extra-textual act, which
forces a court-ultimately the Supreme Court-to decide just how
much it wants to probe the justifications offered for federal or state
legislation. The traditional classification recognizes three broad
types of review. In increasing order of severity, these are: rational
basis, intermediate scrutiny, and strict scrutiny. Each of these standards has its distinctive verbal formulation and its predictable legal
consequences. The rational basis test only asks whether a rational
and fair person could find some (weak) reason to support the statute.
If so, then the statute is constitutional no matter what the strength of
the reasons that might be marshaled on the other side of the case. At
the opposite pole, the strict scrutiny standard holds that the government action falls unless it uses means that are narrowly tailored in
order to achieve a compelling state interest. Somewhere between
these two lies intermediate scrutiny, where the decisive inquiry is
whether the state action is substantially related to some important
government interest.
In most cases, the outcome of litigation depends upon this initial
sorting. When the rational basis test is used, it is rare for government
action to be struck down. All legislation is the product of complex
political forces and brokered deals. Coalitions are the order of the
day. The political process may not lead to ideal compromises, but no
matter how convoluted the process we can be sure that at least one
political constraint will be satisfied. Politics is at least in part a game
27. For a very brief analysis of the subject, see Richard A. Epstein, Taking
the Con out of Con. Law, NAT'L REv., June 3, 2002, at 36.
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of individual self-interest, 2 8 so no statute will pass if everyone loses
from the changes that it creates. Therefore, so long as we can identify a political winner, then we can identify one (lone) social benefit
that enables the statute to past muster. It is not hard to discern such
an interest in this case. The basic text of the Copyright Clause
speaks in terms of the purposes for which copyright (and patent) extension is granted. It is "[t]o promote the Progress of Science and
useful Arts .... " One way to uphold the statute is to give Congress
a wide berth in deciding whether the CTEA advances that laudable
goal. Indeed, the District of Columbia Circuit Court has rejected, in
a context somewhat removed from this one, the view "that the introductory language of the Copyright Clause constitutes a limit on con29
gressional power."
But even if the introductory clause has bite, the rational basis
test gives Congress a lot of scope to decide what legislation serves
that end. Judge Ginsburg noted that Congress thought that the extension of these works would give copyholders "an incentive to preserve
30
older works, particularly motion pictures in need of restoration."
That rationale is hardly ideal. These original prints have value in and
of themselves as artifacts, even if the content they contain may be
reproduced by other individuals or from other sources. Nor does this
stated rationale apply, for example, to musical scores, or even early
performances which are easily preserved and transcribed. Nor does
it take into account the fact that putting the works into the public
domain gives a new class of non-owners like incentives to preserve
and promote works that they use or adopt.

28. For a recent explication, see ROBERT D.
CONSTITUTION

COOTER,

THE STRATEGIC

(2000).

29. Schnapper v. Foley, 667 F.2d 102, 112 (D.C. Cir. 1981) (cited in Eldred
v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 378 (2001)). The issue in Schnapper was whether a
party who created an original work under government commission could copyright that work. It is hard to see why such works should fall into the public
domain any more than inventions created by government-sponsored research
should lie outside the patent law. Indeed, the dominant issue was the statutory
question of whether the (then new) Copyright Act prevented the copyright
from issuing, owing to the rule that copyright protection was not available to
government works, including works by government employees. See Copyrights Act, Pub. L. No. 94-553, §105, 90 Stat. 2541, 2546 (1976). The commissioned work was not created by such employees.
30. Eldred,239 F.3d at 379 (citing S. REP. No. 104-315, at 12 (1996)).
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It is, moreover, possible to construct other rationales for the
statute. Here is one. The unilateral extension of terms, for example,
makes it easier for current copyright holders to decide how much
time and money to invest in promoting their copyrighted works, for
they no longer have to worry about mounting an advertisement campaign that will enhance the value of some presently protected work
after it falls into the public domain. Note the parallel with land: the
creation of perpetual interests in land is justified, in large measure,
because it avoids the awkward transition that would result if the
longest tenancy were for life in a world devoid of future interests. In
the absence of fee interests, at the death of a tenant for life, a freefor-all would ensue until another occupant obtained exclusive rights
to use the land, presumably for another life. This transitional inconvenience makes little sense for land, which is capable of supporting
only a single user. Unlike copyrighted and patented material, land
should never fall into the public domain property. Under a rational
basis test, however, no court carefully weighs these resource-specific
conclusions on any social balance. If the longer term has some tendency to improve dissemination of the copyrighted work during the
remainder of the current term, and perhaps even afterwards, then,
again, the story ends. It is no answer to say that the state could decide to auction off the copyright at the end of its expiration period.
After all, auctions are expensive and create awkward transitional
problems of their own.
Intermediate scrutiny heralds a much tougher look at legislation.
It holds that a statute survives constitutional challenge if it can be
shown to be substantially related to some important governmental interest. 3 1 Under this standard, it no longer suffices to look solely at
the benefits from legislation. The negatives have to be taken into

31. The more complete formulation, at least in connection with the First
Amendment, reads: "[a] government regulation is sufficiently justified if it is
within the constitutional power of the Government and furthers an important or
substantial governmental interest unrelated to the suppression of free expression, and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedom is
no greater than is essential to that interest." United States v. O'Brien, 391 U.S.
367, 367-68 (1968) (upholding regulation forbidding the burning of draft
cards). The decision itself seems wrong by this test for it notes that the draft
card was essential for proving registration for the draft, facilitating communications with the draft board, or showing availability for induction. A photocopy of the card would do as well, even if the original were burnt.
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account as well. In this context, of course, the state interest is the
same as above: "To promote the Progress of Science and useful
Arts..
. ." Only now, the court ratchets up the level of scrutiny on
both the ends to be served and the means available to do it, to see
that Congress has not strayed too far from its only permissible purpose. As such, a court must inquire not only about the statutory
benefits, but also the statutory losses. In theory, all statutes run the
risk of providing too much protection or too little. One instructive
way to (re)characterize intermediate scrutiny is to say that it weights
these two errors equally, and thus, is sharply differentiated from the
rational basis test that weights the danger of insufficient legislative
action far more heavily than that of excessive legislation. In practice, the standard is not as uniform as this brief account would suppose, and many of the First Amendment cases adopting intermediate
scrutiny read as if the intermediate standard
is somewhat closer to
32
strict scrutiny than it is to rational basis.
Using this standard leads to the invalidation of the CTEA in
light of the relative costs and benefits. The social dislocations are
indisputable given that works are kept out of the domain for another
generation. What gains could offset that loss? I attach relatively little weight to any gains associated with extending copyrights for
some works. These works have intrinsic value even after the copyright itself has long expired, and the protection under the new act
covers not only the use of older materials but also the creation of
new derivative works. The stated end at best justifies only a tiny
fraction of the chosen means.
Likewise, the CTEA does little to rationalize the distribution of
copyrighted material. So long as there are limited terms, sooner or
later we shall have to face the discontinuity of having copyrightable
works move from being exclusively private into the public domain.
The holders of these copyrights have for centuries figured out how to
tailor the management of their properties in ways that minimize their
losses under transition. The appropriate response could be as simple
as concentrating advertisement campaigns in daily newspapers and
not on long-term billboard displays. Yet on the other side, nonowners cannot do anything to hasten the arrival of copyrighted works
32. See, e.g., Turner Broad. v. Fed. Trade Comm'n, 512 U.S. 622 (1994)
(upholding "must-carry" regulations in context of cable television).
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into the public domain. It is hard to see how, as an objective matter,
the CTEA serves the stated congressional end of promoting progress
in the sciences and useful arts, as the balance of convenience seems
to lie in favor of striking down the CTEA.
The strict scrutiny standard yields even tougher questions about
the alignment of means to ends. The ends must be weighty and the
fit must be well-nigh perfect. If the CTEA looks wobbly under intermediate scrutiny, then it crumbles under strict scrutiny as applied
to existing copyrights. The extension of the copyright monopoly
cannot survive in the absence of a strong social quid pro quo. End of
case.
B. Choosing the ProperLevel of Scrutiny
The level of scrutiny thus tells the tale: how then should it be
selected? That question requires us to return to the fundamentals of
constitutionalism. Our Constitution was designed to reconcile two
conflicting impulses as captured by the old expression "ordered liberty.",33 One central intellectual strand of the Lockean tradition insists on the distinction between liberty and license. 34 The latter term
consists of the vulgar notion that each person should be allowed to
do whatever he wants whenever he wants to. But that stark position
leads to destructive clashes between intransigents that mark the Hobbesian world. The creation of the war of all against all creates far
more victims than victors. To escape this terrible fate, mankind
"agrees" (in that hypothetical sense) to the mutual restraint on the
use of force, for the betterment of us all. This emphatic declaration
of a system of abstract rights may help define liberty, but words
alone cannot protect any entitlement. Hence, "social contract theory" goes to the second stage by allowing the creation of a state,
funded by taxes, to protect the liberties previously recognized.
The appeal of the social contract system is twofold. The language of contract suggests that the outcome from the use of coercion
results in mutual gains across the board. Who, therefore, may complain about a system that leaves them better off? Only those who
33. Palko v. Connecticut, 302 U.S. 319, 325 (1937) (invoking the concept
to decide which provisions in the original Bill of Rights were incorporated into
the Fourteenth Amendment).
34. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (C.B. Macpher-

son ed., Hackett Publ'g Co. 1980) (1690).
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would like to see others bound by social conventions that they are
free to violate. But if that plea is acknowledged in one case, then it
must be acknowledged in all, allowing the entire system of social
justice to unravel and plunging us back into the state of nature with
elegant but useless rights.
Yet, what sort of government do we trust to enforce the social
compact? Hobbes argues that the terrors of the state of nature were
great enough to induce every individual to cast his lot with an allpowerful sovereign. But clearly we can do better than swapping anarchy for tyranny, tempered only by the "right" to overthrow government when our backs are to the wall. So the Lockean solution invests social resources in government. It adopts a conscious trade-off
to limit the power of the sovereign in ways that alter, for the better,
its (likely) ratio of social-regarding actions to faction-promoting actions, which (in Madison's famous formulation) come at the expense
of the permanent and aggregate interests of society as a whole. 35 No
single strategy does the trick. To Locke, the key transition governed
how individuals formed a government from the state of nature. In
that context, Locke envisioned separation of powers, checks and balances, limited (proportionate) powers of taxation, elected representatives, and the like. The odd twists of history meant that our federal
Constitution was forged in a different context, as a deal among states
that were jealous of their prerogatives. Thus, a federal system with
enumerated central powers was added to the list of techniques for restraining the sovereign.
One of those enumerated powers is of course that to create copyrights and patents. It is easy to understand why that power is delegated to the federal government and not the states. One uniform law
across all states reduces the cost of having to register, interpret, and
enforce copyrights and patents under the laws of multiple states. But
the initial purposive language offers good reason to think that this
power should be reasonably related to its stated end-promotion of the
35. Madison defined faction to cover "a number of citizens, whether
amounting to a majority or minority of the whole, who are united and actuated
by some common impulse of passion, or interest, adverse to the rights of other
citizens, or to the permanent and aggregate interests of the community." THE
FEDERALIST NO. 10, at 57 (James Madison) (Jacob E. Cooke ed., Wesleyan
Univ. Press, 1961). For a modem formal extension of the core idea, see JAMES
M. BUCHANAN & GORDON TULLOCK, THE CALCULUS OF CONSENT

Mich. Press 1974) (1962).

(Univ. of
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progression of science and the useful arts-and this points to intermediate scrutiny. Anything higher looks like a demand for perfection in a setting where it is hard to insist on one true answer. Surely
it raises no constitutional question to set the protected period differently for copyrights and patents, or, on a going forward, to lengthen
or reduce the period of protection by ten percent.
That said, ordinary rational basis review is no more appropriate
here than it is anywhere else. It always throws out the baby with the
bathwater, by creating gaping holes in our system of limited government, in which factional politics can intrude. So long as we embrace Marbury v. Madison,36 then Article I, Section 8, Clause 8 of
the Constitution should be read to impose some intelligible connection between means and ends. As a matter of first principle then, intermediate scrutiny should invalidate the CTEA. But does it in practice?
C. The JudicialResponse
How then does this case play out under the current law? Here,
the prognostication is decidedly cloudy because of the frequent
equivocation on the appropriate standard of review that is brought to
the exercises of congressional power over copyrights and patents.
There are instances in which intermediate scrutiny looks to be the
order of the day, but then there are other cases that take the opposite
tack and appear to embrace in principle (if not in so many words) the
rational basis test. To see how this tangled tale develops, it is useful
to take a somewhat closer look at some of the key decisions that construe the copyright and patent provision within their larger constitutional context.
The customary place to begin this analysis is with Justice
Clark's opinion in Graham v. John Deere Co..37 That case involves
a judicial explication of the non-obviousness requirement added to
the Patent Act in 1952.38 Before examining how two disputed
36. 5 U.S. (1 Cranch) 137 (1803).
37. 383 U.S. 1 (1966).
38. The question asked is whether "the subject matter sought to be patented
and the prior art are such that the subject matter as a whole would have been
obvious at the time the invention was made to a person having ordinary skill in
the art to which said subject matter pertains." 35 U.S.C. § 103 (1964) (cited in
Graham, 383 U.S. at 3).
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inventions fared under this provision, Justice Clark returned to constitutional basics in discussing both the justifications and origins of
the patent system. At the outset, his opinion strikes the pose of intermediate scrutiny:
The Congress in the exercise of the patent power may not
overreach the restraints imposed by the stated constitutional
purpose. Nor may it enlarge the patent monopoly without
regard to the innovation, advancement or social benefit
gained thereby. Moreover, Congress may not authorize the
issuance of patents whose effects are to remove existent
knowledge from the public domain, or to restrict free access
to materials already available. Innovation, advancement,
and things which add to the sum of useful knowledge are
inherent requisites in a patent system which by constitutional command must "promote the Progress of... useful
Arts." This is the standard expressed in the Constitution
and it may not be ignored. And it is in this light that patent
validity "requires reference to a standard written into the
' 39
Constitution."
The insistence on the tight means-ends connection is the hallmark of an intermediate scrutiny test. How then is it possible to distinguish copyright cases that are covered in the same clause? Not by
any standard interpretive technique. That said, however, Graham is
not a case that tests the line between rational basis and intermediate
scrutiny. Most evidently, Graham was written in a tranquil environment that posed no constitutional challenge to the exercise of patent power. The addition of the non-obviousness requirement (above
and beyond the requirements of utility and novelty) only tightened
the patent law and hardly offered the occasion to probe whether
Congress had exceeded the limits of its lawful powers. In principal,
there is a nice question whether the use of the term "discoveries"
necessarily carries with it some version of the non-obviousness requirement, 40 but that issue was never probed in Graham, which only
involved the technical elaboration of the law. Yet, no matter what
39. Graham, 383 U.S. at 5-6 (quoting Great Atl. & Pac. Tea Co. v. Supermarket Equip. Corp., 340 U.S. 147, 154 (1950) (Douglas, J., concurring)).
40. My thanks to Dennis Karjala for this observation. For support of this
observation, see Feist Publ'ns, Inc. v. Rural Tel. Serv. Co., 499 U.S. 340
(1991) (stressing the requirement of "originality" for copyright protection).
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the level of scrutiny, it is hard to see how the non-obviousness
requirement represents a perversion of the objects of patent law or
reads like the illicit outgrowth of some factional intrigue. The statute
looks like the parol evidence rule, like recordation statutes, or the
Statute of Frauds, none of which should give rise to the slightest constitutional concerns. 41 The CTEA, however, is not by any stretch of
the imagination a technical adjustment of the requirements for granting a copyright. It is a plain and simple giveaway of future public
domain resources to the powerful institutional holders of valuable
copyrights. It falls therefore in a different universe from the provision easily sustained in Graham.
Nonetheless, precisely because non-obviousness presents no
constitutional challenge, it is easy to slide toward a more deferential
rational basis frame of mind in order to simplify litigation. Justice
Clark did just that in the passage that follows the one quoted above,
where judicial deference, the hallmark of rational basis review,
surges to the fore:
Within the limits of the constitutional grant, the Congress
may, of course, implement the stated purpose of the Framers by selecting the policy which in its judgment best effectuates the constitutional aim. This is but a corollary to the
grant to Congress of any Article I power. Within the scope
established by the Constitution, Congress may set out conditions and tests for patentability. It is the duty of the
Commissioner of Patents and of the courts in the administration of the patent system to give effect to the constitutional standard by appropriate application, in each case, of
the statutory scheme of the Congress.42
Thus, the question arises, just how much discretion can be read
into these words? In this regard, the words "conditions and tests for
patentability" do not appear to offer carte blanche on all matters of
patent policy. 43

The words surely cover the addition of the

41. See, e.g., Jackson v. Lamphire, 28 U.S. (Pet.) 280, 289 (1830) (sustaining a recordation statute against a Contract Clause challenge). For a more detailed account of how these arguments play out, see Richard A. Epstein, Toward a Revitalization of the ContractClause, 51 U. CHI. L. REv. 703, 740-47
(1984) (discussing statutes of limitations).
42. Graham, 383 U.S. at 6 (citations omitted).
43. See id.
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non-obviousness requirement, and with little effort, cover other conditions of patentability such as novelty, utility, specification, and best
mode. 44 The reason seems clear enough. In the absence of a clear
sense of what the optimal patent system looks like, there is no one
right answer by which to test an endless set of statutory variations.
But doubts over the right standard are not what is at stake with the
CTEA, which is a gratuitous extension of the copyright term that
raises none of the fine-tuning question that any ongoing patent or
copyright system has to face. It is therefore easy to see that any patent or copyright system goes sadly astray when it makes ex gratia extensions of patents or copyrights that are due to fall into the public
domain.
If, of course, the patent statute sails through intermediate scrutiny under Graham, then a fortiori, it sails through under the rational
basis test. So why should the Court not wash its hands of the entire
problem? This above-the-fray approach would make perfect sense if
one could assume as an article of faith that Congress could never
misbehave. If we know at the wholesale level that Congress has the
knowledge and the motivation to serve the public well, then why
waste the time to reprove that contention in each and every case?
Rational basis becomes the standard of choice for reasons of judicial
economy and error minimization: it makes no error (by upholding
every statute) at virtually no cost. Looking at cases individually under an intermediate scrutiny standard holds how the now-risky prospect of invalidating some legislation that should be sustained in order
to strike down some statutes that should not survive. How then do
we draw this balance?
D. The Commerce Clause Analogies
It is most instructive that Justice Clark chose to cite Gibbons v.
Ogden45 as his one constitutional analogy. Gibbons represents Chief
Justice Marshall's initial foray into the construction of that most famous of the enumerated clauses, the Commerce Clause. In all its innocence, the Clause provides: "Congress shall have the power...
[t]o regulate commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several
44. See 35 U.S.C. § 112.

45. 22 U.S. (1 Wheat.) 1 (1824). For my fuller explication of Gibbons, see

Richard A. Epstein, The Proper Scope of the Commerce Clause, 73 VA. L.
REv. 1387, 1401-08 (1987).
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States, and with the Indian Tribes. 46 In dealing with that Clause,
Chief Justice Marshall self-consciously rejected any principle of
strict construction, preferring to allow the words to have their ordinary meaning. 47 This constructional preference must be set in historical context. The champions of the limited Commerce Clause had
urged that it only allowed Congress to supervise trade or commerce
as ships and stagecoaches crossed state borders. 48 Chief Justice Marshall in turn wrote at great length to insist that the term "commerce"
had a broader conception, that included all "intercourse," which in
turn included navigation and travel that started in one state and went
into the interior of another. This conception represented a huge increase in the Clause's scope. 49
It is not, however, as though Chief Justice Marshall ignored the
danger of overreaching. He was equally explicit that inspection and
quarantine laws at either the outset or the conclusion of a journey
were outside the scope of the commerce power. 50 As a Virginian and
slave owner, Chief Justice Marshall was keenly aware that once the
commerce power was read to extend beyond intercourse among the
states, so as to cover agriculture and manufacture, then the entire
(ugly) premise of the original Union, that regulation of the institution
of slavery within the states was not the business of the national government, would come falling down on its own heels. 51 Modern efforts to make it appear that "commerce among" the several states included manufacture and agriculture within them would, of course,
shatter this uneasy sectional truce, and, as a textual matter, do

46. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 3.
47. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (Wheat.) at 188.
48. See, e.g., Livingston v. Van Ingen, 9 Johns. 506 (N.Y. 1812) (asserting
New York's exclusive jurisdiction of internal commerce in the steamboat
cases, even when it affects commerce with citizens of other states).
49. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (1 Wheat.) at 189-91.
50. See id. at 203.
51. Note too that the Constitution also provided: "The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to
admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand
eight hundred and eight. . . ." U.S. CONST. art. I, § 9, cl. 1. After that year
Congress could regulate the importation of slaves. This specific grant of congressional power would be redundant if Congress could regulate manufacture
and agriculture as commerce among the several states.
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violence to the remainder of the Clause. 52 What sense does it make
to speak of manufacture or agriculture "with" foreign nations or
"with" the Indian tribes?
In light of this background, it seems therefore correct to read
Gibbons as an intermediate scrutiny case that balances the dangers of
the overextension of the commerce power against the risks of reducing .it, and the Union with it, to a puny enterprise. Chief Justice Marshall did this job with an elegance that he might not have been aware
of. By making sure that Congress kept the arteries of commerce
open so that goods and services from one state could make their way
into another, Chief Justice Marshall forged a common market of
sorts. Yet by not extending the commerce power to cover internal
manufacture, he respected state sovereignty and promoted competition among the states where none was in a position to blockade or
strangle trade across borders. Therefore, it is no wonder that the
economic growth of the United States was impressive under this legal regime. There was (and is) no particular reason to extend federal
power to areas in which it is likely to do more mischief than good.
The carryover between Gibbons and Graham is instructive for
another reason. The one case that is conspicuously not cited in Graham is Wickard v. Filburn,53 which ran rough-shod over Gibbons'
delicate balance and, at the very least, allowed that the regulation of
all economic affairs fell within the province of the national government. As later cases made clear, the standard of judicial review
drove the shift. No longer did the Court think that there was any serious danger in any overextension of the commerce power that allowed the federal government to regulate any area. Quite the opposite at the time, the Wagner Act, whose constitutionality was
(incorrectly) sustained in Labor Board v. Jones & Laughlin Steel
Corp.,54 warmly embraced the extension of federal power over all la-

bor relations. 55 So in its new incarnation, one form of error-the excessive concentration of centralized power--counted for nought.
52. See Robert J. Pushaw, Jr. & Grant S. Nelson, A Critique of the Narrow
Interpretationof the Commerce Clause, 96 Nw. U. L. REv. 695 (2002). Marshall rejected this broad reading of "among," when he wrote: "[c]omprehensive
as the word among is, it may very properly be restricted to that commerce
which concerns more States than one." Gibbons, 22 U.S. (Wheat.) at 195.
53. 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
54. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
55. See id. at 46-47.
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Likewise, it was thought that the absence of federal power would
create a constitutional void of major dimensions. It therefore took
little ingenuity to apply the rational basis test to all sorts of small local activities, which in their "cumulative effect" inevitably had the
necessary impact on interstate commerce. 56 When the retreat on the
commerce power began, in halting fashion, in United States v. Lopez, 57 the anguished dissents of Justices Souter and Breyer appealed
to the rational basis test in order to explain why the Court had overstepped its hand in striking down this (or indeed, any) congressional
enactment. 58 It therefore counts as a chip in favor of the intermediate
scrutiny standard that Justice Clark, who surely knew about Wickard,
chose to pass it by in silence. Perhaps then, Graham means what it
says, and says what it means-a rarity for constitutional law.
The relevance of the Commerce Clause analogies did not, moreover, escape the eye of Judge Sentelle in his dissent in Eldred. As if
by clockwork, Judge Sentelle opens with a reference to Lopez to insist, as did Chief Justice Rehnquist before him, that it is necessary to
begin with first principles, including the cardinal principle that the
enumeration of powers in Article I was intended to limit the sphere
of government action in order to preserve the liberties of its citizens. 59 He then concluded that if the extension of copyright terms
for existing works fell within the scope of the Copyright Clause, that
nothing could fall outside its reach. 60 Question: how is its reach determined? Answer: by noting the stated purposes for which copyrights are granted, and showing that this statute does not advance on
balance the progress of science and useful arts. In dealing with this
issue, Judge Sentelle is more concerned with the "limited Times"
provision, by noting that if this extension is permissible, then so is
another, and yet another, until the copyright protection "for limited
Times" becomes permanent in all but name. 61 But he could have
said that some extensions might make sense if there were a quid pro
quo in the opposite direction, of which none was in evidence here.
56. See, e.g., Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 154 (1971); Maryland v.
Wirtz, 392 U.S. 183, 193 (1968).
57. 514 U.S. 549 (1995).

58. See id. at 603 (Souter, J., dissenting); id. at 616-17 (Breyer, J., dissenting).
59. See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 380-81 (Sentelle, J., dissenting).
60. See id. at 383.
61. See id. at 381-82.
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The situation, however, looks quite different when other key
cases are taken into account. As Judge Ginsburg stressed, the previous statutes all extended existing patents, 62 but he cites no cases in
which these extensions were subject to judicial challenge. Of course,
silence is not dispositive of the question in his favor, but it is suggestive of the sentiments of those who knew something about the area
and had every incentive to make the right judgment about the anticipated impact of the Supreme Court's behavior. It is therefore helpful
to look at some of the early authorities to see if Judge Ginsburg has
drawn blood.
The most powerful case for upholding the CTEA was not cited
in Eldred. Evans v. Jordan63 involved an extraordinary piece of legislation. After having received several state colonial patents, in
1790, Evans obtained a fourteen-year federal patent for his hopperboy, an elevator for hoisting wheat and grain inside mills. That initial patent expired in 1804. Four years later in 1808, Congress
passed a special act-An Act for the relief of Oliver Evans 64 which
granted him a new patent for a term of up to fourteen years for the
original hopperboy and improvements thereon. The terms of that
grant contained an exception that read:
Provided,That no person who may have heretofore paid the
said Oliver Evans for license to use his said improvements
shall be obliged to renew said license, or be subject to damages for not renewing the same: And provided also, That
no person who shall have used the said improvements, or
have erected the same for use, before the issuing of the said
65
patent, shall be liable to damages therefor.
The question of statutory construction raised by this case concerned the exposure to liability of those who relied on the public domain status of the invention between 1804 and 1808. Everyone
agreed that these people were protected against suit for activities that
were confined within that period, be they use or construction. 66 But
what about the use after 1808 of an infringing machine that had been
62. See id. at 379 n.*.
63. 8 F. Cas. 872 (C.C.D. Va. 1813) (No. 4,564), aff'd 13 U.S. (9 Cranch)
199(1815).
64. Act of Jan. 21, 1808, ch. 13, 6 Stat. 70 (1808).

65. Id.

66. See Evans, 8 F. Cas. at 873.
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properly constructed in the interim, in reliance on its public domain
status? I think that the statute could be read to protect those who
"have erected the same for use" during this period. But both Chief
Justice Marshall, riding circuit, and the full Supreme Court, speaking
through Justice Bushrod Washington, thought that the question of
statutory construction was too obvious the other way to merit any extended analysis. Whatever the equities in favor of the interim user,
they both concluded that he was required to pay Evans full freight for
any use done after the passage of the statute, even if he had relied on
the quasi-permanent status of the public domain.
In cases of patents, although some injustice may ensue from
imposing a price to be paid to the inventor, on the future
use of a machine.., yet the great fundamental principles of
right, and of property, do not appear to be so vitally
wounded as to induce the court to resist and struggle against
67
the obvious meaning of words.
No reverence for those eternal verities here. Chief Justice Marshall
then turns to the constitutional objection, based on Congress's power
over patents and copyrights pursuant to the Copyright Clause, which
he likewise dismisses with little more than a wave of the hand.
That construction of the constitution which admits the renewal of a patent, is not controverted. A renewed patent,
then, has the same obligation, and confers the same rights,
with an original patent. The inchoate property which vested
by the discovery, is prolonged by the renewed patent, as
well as by the original patent. There may be powerful reasons with the legislature for guarding a renewed patent, by
restrictions and regulations, not to be imposed on original
patents; but these reasons address themselves to the legislature only. If they have been overlooked or disregarded in
68
the hall of congress, it is not for this court to set them up.
With only a bit less elegance, Justice Washington for a unanimous Supreme Court reiterated the same conclusion. At no point in
this sorry episode did either Justice utter the fatal words "rational basis," but surely that standard governed their every move. Any law
entitled "for the relief of Oliver Evans" reads like a reverse Bill of
67. Evans, 8 F. Cas. at 873.
68. Id. at 874.
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Attainder. Its ad hoc character condemns it as a blatant piece of special legislation that almost makes us pine for the principled generality of the CTEA. 69 Worse still, unlike the CTEA, this Act revived a
patent on an invention that had already fallen into the public domain,
as none of the copyright extension acts had done. Nor was this simply a question of reversing policy before anyone had acted in reliance on the changed situation. Rather, Evans's cozy statute applied
to people who thought that the public domain could not be undone by
a reverse act of Congress. That which was once public domain became private property anew without so much as the sign of a quid
pro quo.
So dismal a performance shows that the modem Supreme Court
does not have any intellectual monopoly on the (mis)use of the rational basis test. But it also demonstrates that if Evans carries over
today, then the attack on the CTEA is surely a lost cause. It is not as
though Chief Justice Marshall and Justice Washington thought no
word of protest could be uttered against the Act. It is only that all
words of protest should be directed to the Congress that enacted this
sorrowful statute, which in its own power could, for all we know,
have repealed this special Act without having to compensate Evans
for his loss of property under the new enactment. The Takings
Clause was part of the original Bill of Rights, and no one doubted
70
then or now, that it applies at the very least to actions by Congress.
But here, it looks as though property that is created by Congress can,
by implication, be destroyed by Congress, so that we are living
within a constitutional twilight zone.
Evans is not the only case that appears to treat Congress's power
over copyrights and patents as plenary. Judge Ginsburg also relies

69. Note too that the nineteenth century had, in general, a greater toleration
for these special enactments than we do. The battle over general incorporation
statutes, which heated up in the middle of the nineteenth century, was but another application of the same practice. So long as legislatures could dole out
corporate charters to their preferred minions, then those lucky enough to receive them had a quasi-monopoly advantage over others who were forced to do
business in some inferior vehicle which did not, inter alia, have the advantage
of limited liability. On the early history of special charters, see Henry Butler,
Nineteenth-Century JurisdictionalCompetition in the Granting of Corporate
Privileges, 14 J. LEGAL STUD. 129 (1985).
70. See Barron v. Mayor of Baltimore, 32 U.S. (7 Pet.) 243 (1833) (Takings
Clause of Fifth Amendment only applies to the federal government).
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on McClurg v. Kingsland71 to bolster the proposition that Congress
has "plenary" power under the Copyright Clause. That phrase, of
course, was previously used by Chief Justice Marshall in Gibbons,
where it had a somewhat different meaning-namely it referred to
the limited sphere in which no state could trump an act of Congress. 72 It did not mean that there were no restrictions on the scope
of Congress's power at all. The Copyright Clause reads the same
way. No external power trumps its operation, but that is hardly the
same as saying that the scope of the Clause can be determined without reference to its internal preamble.
The facts of McClurg,moreover, do not remotely reveal any pattern of abuse. The defendant in this case had used an invention with
the leave of his employee before the adoption of the Patent Act of
1837. 73 The patent was then obtained by the employee and assigned
to the plaintiffs who claimed that he had acted in violation of a new
patent subsequently issued under the new law. The gist of the
Court's opinion was only that the patent assignee stood in the shoes
of his assignor, and that neither party could use the passage of the
new statute to undermine the validity of the previous license to the
defendant employer; nor could the plaintiff overcome the objection
that no patent should have been allowed to issue in the first place
given that the patent applicant had made public use of the invention
and allowed others to use it prior to the time that he filed for the patent. 74 Judge Ginsburg quotes from this decision as follows:
Whether [the defendant's] exceptions [based on his defenses against the assignees] are well taken or not, must depend on the law as it stood at the emanation of the patent,
together with such changes as have been since made; for
though they may be retrospective in their operation, that is
not a sound objection to their validity; the powers of Congress to legislate upon the subject of patents is plenary by
the terms of the Constitution, and as there are no restraints
on its exercise, there can be no limitation of their right to
71. 42 U.S. (1 How.) 202 (1843).
72. See Gibbons, 22 U.S. (Wheat.) at 196-97. For explication of this misunderstood term, see Richard A. Epstein, Commerce Power, 73 VA. L. REv.
1387, 1401-04 (1987).
73. See McClurg, 42 U.S. (I How.) at 204-05.
74. See id. (discussing Pennock v. Dialogue, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) 1 (1829)).
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modify them at their pleasure, so that they do not take away
the rights of property in existing patents. 75
This passage does use the term "plenary" but it does so in a context that presents none of the stark issues raised by the CTEA. The
difficulty the Court faced in McClurg was to deal with the continuity
of patents, and the licenses under them in the transition between two
somewhat different statutory regimes. That decision did not deal
with the extension of a patent beyond its original term, but only
sought to make sure that Congress could not "take away the rights of
property in existing patents" with its change in the law-asserted
rights which in the instant case proved unavailing. 76 More telling,
perhaps, was its reliance on Pennock v. Dialogue in which Justice
Story took a rather different view of the scope of the patent power.
Public (including very limited) use or disclosure of the patent resulted, in his view, in the loss of patent protection:
It has not been, and indeed cannot be denied, that an inventor may abandon his invention, and surrender or dedicate it
to the public. This inchoate right, thus once gone, cannot
afterwards be resumed at his pleasure; for, where gifts are
once made to the public in this way, they become absolute.
Thus, if a man dedicates a way, or other easement to the
public, it is supposed to carry with it a permanent right of
7
user.

7

This passage does not refer to any magical power of Congress to
override the basic principles of property law as they address the interface between public and private rights. It only speaks to the want
of power in an owner to reclaim what he has given away. But if an
easement over land is gone once it is dedicated to the public, then
why not a future interest in a copyright? It is dedicated to the public
at the time of its creation. We know that the owner cannot pull it
back at pleasure. Why then allow Congress to do so on his behalf?
Neither Pennock nor McClurg answer this last question of what
Congress can do in this situation. But these cases, far from involving
congressional giveaways in the tradition of Evans, are in fact much

75. McClurg, 42 U.S. (1 How.) at 206 (cited in Eldred, 239 F.3d at 380).
76. Id.
77. Pennock, 27 U.S. (2 Pet.) at 16.
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more restrictive of the rights of putative patent holders. When read
in light of their facts, they hardly provide support for the CTEA.
The question thus remains: is Congress's power over patents
and copyrights as plenary as these decisions state? Here one hopes
that the answer to this question is in the negative. The entire structure of constitutional review was in its infancy in 1813. Chief Justice
Marshall did not give the slightest attention to the scope of judicial
review or the scope of copyright and patent protection, directed as
they were to limited objectives. It is hard to see anything but political intrigue in Evans. There is no reason to fear that striking down
so blatant an illustration of special pleading will force the Court, under any standard of review, to act as a perpetual court of revision for
all the fine-tuning that necessarily takes place under the patent law,
on, for example, such doctrinal issues as raised in Pennock, or on the
tricky transitional issues raised in McClurg. Judged by these standards, striking down the CTEA becomes an easy case because all the
benefits move so sharply in one direction, and the burdens so sharply
in the other. The passage of the CTEA, no more than the Act for the
benefit of Oliver Evans, does not work to promote the progress of
science and the useful arts. Overturning the CTEA does not plunge
the court into an endless array of delicate judgments without rudder
or compass.
There are, unfortunately, recent passages in the Supreme Court,
duly cited by Judge Ginsburg, that point to a continued fascination
with judicial deference to legislative action. 78 But these observations
are hardly the result of serious constitutional reflection. Rather they
are preludes to the discussion of difficult questions of statutory interpretation and social policy. Thus, in Sony Corporationv. Universal
City Studios, the question before the Court was whether to uphold
claims of contributory infringement against the makers of the Betamax (the home video tape recording system) on the ground that its
equipment allowed users to tape copyrighted programs that they
could then replay while fast-forwarding through the commercials.
The questions here on liability are quite different by any standard.
The new technology, among other features, expands the markets for
television shows, by allowing people to view them, with or without
78. See, e.g., Stewart v. Abend, 495 U.S. 207, 230 (1990); Sony Corp. v.
Universal City Studios, 464 U.S. 417 (1984).
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commercials, at some more convenient time. The equipment also
has important non-infringing uses. There is nothing about a standard
of intermediate scrutiny (unlike strict scrutiny) that starts with the
presumption of unconstitutionality. The case here is evidently one
with profound social consequences, but it is a far cry from the
straight giveaway that is involved in the CTEA.
Stewart v. Abend, for its part, is an even easier case. At issue,
there was a contest between the respondent, who was an assignee of
the (renewed) copyright in the original underlying work, and the petitioner, who took his assignment from the original author who died
before the renewal of the original copyright. His estate sought to assign the copyright to the petitioner, but its effort was rebuffed because the Supreme Court held that the renewal created a "new estate"
that wiped out the earlier licensee issued to the petitioner. That decision, which is strangely reminiscent of McClurg, raises the same
kind of technical dispute between rival copyright claimants. It is
hard to see why any statutory fix to the assignment problem should
not survive intermediate scrutiny.
Looked at on their facts, both these cases are miles apart from
Eldred. Judged by these standards, striking down the CTEA becomes an easy case because all the benefits move so sharply in one
direction, and the burdens so sharply in the other. Overturning the
CTEA does not plunge the court into an endless array of delicate
judgments without rudder or compass. Unfortunately, a deferential
pattern has been picked up in other cases dealing with takings and
environmental regulation79 and telecommunications.
Yet here we
do not have to throw up our hands, for this unilateral extension of the
copyright term sticks out like a sore thumb.
III. THE FREEDOM OF SPEECH CHALLENGES TO THE CTEA

The second line of challenge to the CTEA argues that it constitutes an impermissible restriction on the freedom of speech protected
under the First Amendment. Trying to assess this claim is always
treacherous, not only for copyrights, but also for privacy and trade

secrets. In each case it looks as though the private law at either the
79. See Tahoe-Sierra Pres. Council, Inc. v. Tahoe Reg'l Planning Agency,
122 S.Ct. 1465 (2002).
80. See Verizon Comm., Inc. v. FCC, 122 S.Ct. 1646 (2002).
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federal or state level has created some property interest that limits the
powers of others to speak. Yet it would be bizarre in the extreme to
say that all copyright, all rights of publicity, or all trade secrets fall
before the First Amendment. The question then is how to think
about the issue in order to avoid such an extreme conclusion.
In dealing with thisquestion Judge Ginsburg tookthe view that,
seemingly as a matter of definition, the constitutional guarantees of
freedom of speech pick up where the law of intellectual property
leaves off.8 1 In dealing with copyrighted material, the law of copyright only protects the expression of ideas and not the ideas themselves. The facts and ideas that inspire the creation of the copyrighted work remain in the public domain even after their expression
receives protection under the copyright law. 82 The Supreme Court
drew exactly the same distinction in connection with its newly
minted tort of misappropriation in InternationalNews Service v. Associated Press,83 where Justice Pitney was quite explicit in his view
that the scope of the Copyright Clause did nothing to take historical
facts out of the public domain:
But the news element-the information respecting current
events contained in the literary production-is not the creation of the writer, but is a report of matters that ordinarily
are publicijuris; it is the history of the day. It is not to be
supposed that the framers of the Constitution, when they
empowered Congress "to promote the progress of science
and the useful arts, by securing for limited times to authors
and inventors the exclusive right to their respective writings
and discoveries" (Const., Art. I, §8, par. 8), intended to confer upon one who might happen to be the first to report a
historic event the exclusive
right for any period to spread
84
the knowledge of it.
Justice Pitney then reached the same conclusion about the shortterm protection against the appropriation of its stories by direct competitors. The protection was afforded against using someone else's

81. See Eldred v. Reno, 239 F.3d 372, 376 (D.C. Cir. 2001).
82. See Harper & Row Publishers, Inc. v. Nation Enters., 471 U.S. 539
(1985).
83. 248 U.S. 215 (1918).
84. Id. at 234.
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story as the sole source of one's newspaper account.85 But clearly,
any number of writers and papers could cover any historical event.
Nor can ideas (including natural and mathematical laws) be patented,
for courts have consistently held that the scope of a patentable invention does not authorize any individual
to obtain a patent that removes
86
ideas from the public domain.
On every side the creation of intellectual property is hemmed in
by concerns for freedom of speech, whether or not these matters have
received an explicit First Amendment analysis. The question, therefore, is how these pieces fit together. And once again this question
turns on the standard of judicial review. Here, only the rational basis
test could sustain Judge Ginsburg's position that freedom of speech
begins where intellectual property rights leave off. But that approach
carries with it the odd implication that the state law of unfair competition, or the federal law of copyrights and patents, always shoulder
the First Amendment aside. Yet everywhere else the First Amendment is (rightly) governed by a complex admixture of strict and intermediate scrutiny. Judge Ginsburg's approach requires one to decide where rational basis leaves off and intermediate scrutiny begins.
A more unified approach should lead to a more analysis of this case
under both clauses. A definitional balance won't do it. So what
will?
I think that the best technique in the area of speech is to go back
to the original state of nature analysis, outlined above, that best accounts for the creation of the state. To recall, the basic gambit of all
85. See id. at 244-45.
86. See, e.g., Funk Bros. Seed Co. v. Kalo Inoculent Co., 333 U.S. 127, 130
(1948) (noting that patents cannot issue for the discovery of nature). "The
qualities of these bacteria, like the heat of the sun, electricity, or the qualities of
metals, are part of the storehouse of knowledge of all men." Id. The case then
went on to hold, wrongly in my view, that the discovery of the compatibility of
certain nitrogen fixing bacteria with each other fell within that description,
when it sounds much more like an empirically discovered industrial application of some genuine import. See id.; see also Gottschalk v. Benson, 409 U.S.
63, 71 (1972) ("It is conceded that one may not patent an idea."). But the use
of algorithms with empirical inputs and outputs are rather different matters.
See, e.g., Diamond v. Diehr, 450 U.S. 175 (1981) (mathematical formula patentable when used in a process designed to be protected by patent); Arrhytmia
Research Tech., Inc. v. Corazonix Corp., 958 F.2d 1053 (Fed. Cir. 1992) (patent upheld on invention to read electrocardiographic signals, as more than a
simple algorithm).
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social contract theories is an empiricaljudgment that all individuals
are better off with the mutual renunciation of the use of force than
with its unbridled use. 8 7 An endless array of actual bilateral contracts cannot achieve that outcome, so it is up to the state to impose a
grand social contract that creates like benefits and imposes like burdens on all citizens, present and future. So long as the benefits exceed the burdens, as we are confident they do with the renunciation
of force, then the social contract does, in a high-cost transaction setting, what voluntary contracts would achieve if transaction costs
were lower.
The analysis starts when the use of force carries over to speech
as well as conduct. The most obvious point of tangency comes from
the use of threats of force. In a world in which all people knew that
no one used force, no "threat" of force would ever be credible. Everyone would ignore the ostensible threat because by assumption, no
one could act on it. It is like trying to bluff in poker when all cards
are exposed. But in a world without perfect enforcement, threats of
force do become both credible and dangerous because they encourage people to surrender their liberty and their property, which is
theirs as a matter of (Lockean) right. The choice between your
money or your life is usually easy, and the criminal law of extortion
is designed to see that people are not forced to make that choice. But
now suppose that all individuals are entitled to freedom of speech
under the First Amendment. Does it follow that any legal restriction
against threats of force must fall by the wayside? Not if we recall the
distinction between liberty and license that motivated the basic social
contract theory.
But how so? We could play the definitional game and argue that
coercive threats are just not "speech," when it is all too clear that
they are. After all, threats to commit lawful acts are speech, so why
does the lawfulness of the act change the speech content of the
threat? What we want to do is abandon the art of legal definition,
and put forward some consistent justification that explains why this
limitation on speech is consistent with the basic constitutional command. With force proper, social contract theory treats the coerced
limitation on freedom of action as justified so long as it generates
87. See JOHN LOCKE, SECOND TREATISE OF GOVERNMENT (C.B. Macpher-

son ed., Hacket Pub'g Co. 1980) (1690).
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mutual gain for all citizens-which it does in the form of peace and
good order. Nothing prevents the same approach from being used in
miniature to deal with speech in all its manifestations. The bald
threat, "your money or your life," said by a robber with a gun to
one's head is a form of speech, and it is proscribed precisely because
of its impermissible substantive content.
The question then is how far can this logic be carried. The answer is as far as the logic of mutual gain from reciprocal prohibitions
will allow it. That said, the question becomes hard on a number of
dimensions. Suppose, initially, that the threat is not the threat to use
force, but the threat to charge lower prices in the marketplace than
some rival. Here, so long as competition is legal, the threat to compete is legal as well. The threats in question must, presumptively, be
of actions that are illegal in and of themselves, of which the use of
force is Exhibit A. But are all threats, whenever and however made,
so covered? Here it is easy to see why we punish those threats that
have achieved their intended purpose, i.e., to get the victim to turn
over his wallet. But the question is much more difficult when the
threat is prospective and its target is unclear. Now we have to negotiate an underworld of express and implied threats. How, for example, does one treat political demonstrations that urge the overthrow
of the government? Or picketing, which could be either for information or for coercion? Does it matter whether the pickets surround an
industrial plant enmeshed in a labor dispute, or an abortion clinic that
performs late-term (or indeed any) abortions? The blunt truth is that
courts of equity have struggled with only limited success to determine when an injunction should be issued and under what terms.
The constitutional laws face the same constraints of uncertainty and
the like. They will not be able to outperform the old equity judges.
In our own political tradition, the pendulum has swung with
time in favor of a rule that waits until there is an imminent threat of
substantial harm. 88 We could quibble with that determination one
way or the other. But whatever we think of the outcome, we should
at least be clear on the correct intellectual approach. There are two
forms of error: under and over enforcement. The dangers of under
enforcement are, usually, somewhat less than they are for over
88. See, e.g., Brandenburg v. Ohio, 395 U.S. 444 (1969) (finding that the
mere abstract teaching for a resort to force is not the same as inciting or producing imminent lawless or violent action).
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enforcement because tort liability and criminal punishment, with
their deterrent effect, remain available once the offense is completed,
even though in some cases that may be too late. Hence, we allow
laws against combination, aiding and abetting, conspiracy, and the
like, which normally do not run afoul of the First Amendment, because of the firm belief that those laws generate social improvements.
What is true for threats of force is also true of fraud. A rule that
makes fraud an illegal form of speech will increase the security of
transactions and offer massive across-the-board gains. Given these
ample justifications, we recognize that the First Amendment does not
prohibit its punishment. Yet by the same token it does not answer
every question without a good deal more work: do we include concealment and nondisclosure within the class of fraud cases? How do
we distinguish between puffery and fraud? Do we apply the same
standards to commercial and political speech? What is the relationship between fraud and defamation? Between fraud and innocent
misrepresentation? What is the role of injunctive relief, either by
public or private parties? Here again, my only purpose is to pose
questions, not to answer or review answers that others have given to
them. Ideally, our job is to find rules that work Pareto improvements
over some prior distribution, that is, those improvements that leave at
least some better off and no one worse off than before. 89 In some
contexts, it is difficult to achieve that goal and we may be forced to
settle for results that are Kaldor-Hicks improvements, namely, those
which produce gains on aggregate but still leave individual losers.
But in this case we do not have to trouble ourselves over the difficult
trade-offs that come when some individuals are left behind in overall
improvements. Making fraud illegal is one step to convert license to
liberty: it is hard to deny its beneficial effects across the board. But
it is much harder to figure out the optimal remedial structure once
this initial step is accepted.
89. Indeed, it is often desirable to go one step further, and to leave everyone
better off (after side payments are made) to the same extent. See RICHARD A.
EPSTEIN, TAKINGS: PRIVATE PROPERTY AND THE POWER OF EMINENT DOMAIN

3-5 (1985). This stronger view has some resonance in the cases that stress disproportionate impact as the touchstone of a takings violation. See, e.g., Armstrong v. United States, 364 U.S. 40, 49 (1960) (entitling leinholders just compensation under the Fifth Amendment).
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Thus far, I have stressed the way in which guarantees of freedom of speech intersect with force and fraud because those are the
two staples of the libertarian tradition. But we edge closer to cases
of intellectual property, and to the matter at hand when we look to
two of the other great potential heads of government regulation:
taxation and the control of monopoly. It might be tempting to argue
that all forms of speech count as free only if they are immune from
all forms of taxation. But in some cases, taxation provides for the
public services that protect newspapers and broadcasters as much as
they do banks and factories. The general view, therefore, is that
taxes that do not single out the media, or any segment of it, for special treatment will pass muster under the First Amendment, even if
discriminatory (including progressive) taxes do not. 90 The implicit
assumption is that a well-structured tax overcomes serious free-rider
problems. To the extent that taxed firms are better off with the general tax than they are without it, this limitation on the freedom is
again justified under the First Amendment.
A similar analysis applies to the application of the antitrust laws.
Although too often forgotten, it was none other than Justice Rufus
Peckham of Lochner v. New York 91 who made it crystal clear that the
general principle of freedom of contract did not confer any general
immunity on contracts and combinations in restraint of trade.92 I put
aside the hard question of whether we should stop with the common
law solution-which was not to enforce these contracts-or the
Sherman Antitrust Act, which creates a tort-like remedy in victims
for treble damages, coupled with government enforcement of the basic prohibition. All that is needed for these purposes is the recognition that a pure competitive situation outperforms these monopoly arrangements, so that we can create social improvements off a
common-law baseline that allows all action apart from force and
fraud. That proposition is as true for newspaper and broadcast media
cartels as anywhere else. No court has read the First
Amendment to
93
confer antitrust immunity on broadcast companies.

90. See Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm'r of Revenue, 460
U.S. 575 (1983) (invalidating the special use tax).
91. See 198 U.S. 45 (1905).

92. Addyston Pipe & Steel Co. v. United States, 175 U.S. 211 (1899).
93. See Associated Press v. United States, 326 U.S. 1 (1945).
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Just this same analysis applies to the copyright law as well. The
initial baseline is that any restriction on speech counts as a limitation
on its freedom. The issue is whether these restrictions can be justified. With copyright law, the justification for restricting speech is
that it will promote the production of copyrighted works by creating
the incentive for their production. In the end, we will get more
speech and better speech if we allow people to charge for their creations. Therefore, we have an overall social improvement that creates
a new baseline, which allows for some copyright protection. Indeed,
that baseline is so strong that the property rights thus created are
themselves subject to strong protection under the Takings
Clause,
94
which covers all forms of private property, not just land.
But this general declaration does not settle the question of how
much. If you run a business or build an ugly house, I am allowed to
criticize your activities as a matter of right. The same principle of
criticism is as important for copyrighted works as for anything else.
So if the law of copyright first created an exclusive right to use certain modes of expression, that law would run into fatal constitutional
objections if it did not permit anyone to utter a word in criticism
about it. But how can one criticize a novel or a movie without quoting its lines or printing its pictures? Thus, the principle of fair use
(closely related to the defamation law's view of fair comment) has
grown up so that the monopoly over the sale and use of the copyrighted item does not stifle any and all criticism of it. The exact contours of the fair use doctrine95 are, for the moment, neither here nor
there. What matters for these points is that we create yet another vast
social improvement by allowing free criticisms of copyrighted
works. That criticism is only effective insofar as it can draw on elements of the work itself. But this privilege in turn should not be so
broad as to allow for the reproduction of the protected work under
the guise of exposing it to criticism. Indeed, to permit the wholesale
rebroadcast of any work starts to look like an expropriation of that
94. See, e.g., Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986 (1984) (trade secret property rights protected by Takings Clause).
95. See Harper& Row, 471 U.S. at 560-61 (The factors Congress considered "especially relevant": "(1) the purpose and character of the use; (2) the
nature of the copyrighted work; (3) the substantiality of the portion used in relation to the copyrighted work as a whole; (4) the effect on the potential market
for or value of the copyrighted work.").
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work that96runs afoul of the Fifth Amendment's protection of private
property.
This same analysis can be brought to bear on the CTEA. Here
there is no question that, prima facie, the law has to place a restriction on freedom of speech because it will keep material out of the
public domain on the expiration of the original copyright. Once we
abandon the misleading language of "definitional balance," then the
real question is whether we can justify this restriction on speech. If
we apply any version of the intermediate scrutiny standard, we are
now back to exactly the same position we were in under the Copyright Clause. What justification is there for restricting speech when
the public does not receive in exchange any quid pro quo worthy of
its name? Intermediate scrutiny produces the same result under the
First Amendment that it does under the Copyright Clause. This restriction on speech fails because it produces no important advancement of any important social interest.
IV. THE PUBLIC TRUST VARIATION

The same point, ironically, can be made in yet another fashion.
In the initial argument of the case before the District Court, 97 Eldred
advanced an argument that the CTEA was a violation of the public
trust doctrine, as articulated in Illinois Central Railroad Co. v. Illinois.9 8 That argument, to say the least, does not have a secure textual
home under the Constitution, but it articulates a vision that is as applicable in this case as it is in any other. As I have written earlier,
the public trust doctrine should be understood as the converse and
complement to the eminent domain power.99 The eminent domain
power requires the payment of just compensation as property moves
from private into public hands. It does so in order to make sure that
-96. See, e.g., Zacchini v. Scripps-Howard Broad., Inc., 433 U.S. 562 (1977)

(allowing state tort protection against appropriation when defendant broadcasted plaintiffs "entire act").
97. For a succinct and powerful statement of the arguments on copyright,
see Memorandum in Support of Plaintiffs Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings or, in the Alternative, for Summary Judgment and in Opposition to Defendant's Motion for Judgment on the Pleadings at 52-62, Eldred v. Reno, 74
F. Supp. 2d I (D.D.C. 1999).

98. 146 U.S. 387 (1892).
99. See Richard A. Epstein, The Public Trust Doctrine, 7 CATO J. 411
(1987).
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the actions of government are not driven by factional concerns, but
are rather efforts to make uniform advances that benefit all members
of society. The public trust doctrine deals with the converse situation, when public property is transferred for private use. Here the
analogous concern is with the prevention of transactions that enrich a
single individual or a small group of people at the expense of the
public at large. That result occurs whenever public property (including public domain property) is given away or sold for less than it is
worth. The applicable provision should be understood as providing:
"Nor shall public property be given for private use, without just
compensation."
The usual application of this provision is to the transfer of land
or minerals to which the government holds standard proprietary title.
In this instance, we have public domain property to which no individual holds any kind of title at all; and the transfer in question will
not be of a present interest, but of a future interest that is due to fall
into possession at the expiration of these copyrights. But neither of
these differences in the details of the transaction deflect the operation
of the basic principle. Public domain property is of enormous value
to all members of the public because of the unfettered use rights that
it confers. When that subject matter is made private in some individual, then these use rights are lost. It hardly matters that these are
rights to pictures and stories instead of rights to walk along public
ways or swim in public waters. Nor does it make any difference in
principle that these interests will vest in possession only in the future.
The ordinary remainder interest is fully protected, even if it falls into
possession only at the expiration of all prior present interests. It
hardly follows that those interests could be ignored by the tenant in
possession (who is answerable under an action for waste) or taken by
the government without compensation. The basic unsavory political
dynamic of helping one's friends at the expense of the public at large
is not altered because the interests transferred will fall into possession only in the future.
So in the end we are taken back to exactly the same place and
for exactly the same reason that we were under both the Copyright
Clause and the First Amendment. Giveaways are bad business.
They are inconsistent with any system of constitutional governance.
Once that simple point is recognized, then it hardly matters whether
we start with the Copyright Clause, the First Amendment, or even
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the public trust doctrine. All roads lead to Rome: the condemnation
of government giveaways. Let the Supreme Court analyze this problem under intermediate scrutiny, and it will surely come up with the
right answer. Let it put on the blinders of the rational basis test, and
its deferential posture will lead to make weak, even fatuous, arguments in favor of a statute that should never have seen the light of
day. Let us hope that the Court remembers that it is a Constitution
that we are construing. If it does, then it will consign the CTEA, insofar as it extends the lives of existing copyrights, to the constitutional oblivion that it so richly deserves.

